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TOWARDS NEWER SOURCES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
TANIA VELLA 
ARTICLE 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
invites the Court to apply international law through the four en­
listed sources which are traditionally recognised at international 
law, namely, treaties, custom, general principles of law accepted 
by civilised nations and the opinions of qualified publicists. What 
must be determined, however, and is the subject-matter of deep 
controversy, is whether and to what extent these traditional sour­
ces are being supplanted by newer sources in the international 
sphere. In this regard it would be pertinent to examine the role 
played by the resolutions of diplomatic assemblies, particularly 
those of the United Nations, and by the works of the International 
Law Commission in the cod if ic at ion of international law. 
It must be borne in mind that the very enumeration of the sour­
ces in the Statute is indicative of the fact that a need for them to 
be laid down was felt at the time they were created. In the words 
of H.W.A. Thirlway, 'the enumeration of the source of the law is, 
as it were, a function of the development of the community, and 
there is no obstacle of theory to the alteration of that enumeration 
resulting, as did the original enumeration, from the requirements 
of that community. As a community develops, the sources of law 
which it recognises may change not merely in relative importance 
but in effective existence. New sources may be tapped and old 
ones cease to flow' • 1 
At the time the sources were formally enumerated in the Statute, 
such a course of action must have been considered to be the most 
exhaustive attempt at ensuring stability and certainty of the law 
in the international field. Time and actual practice have shown 
however that new sources have been 'tapped' even though the old 
ones have not, as yet, ceased to flow. 
To those who have witnessed the unwieldy process of custom 
1International Customary Law and Codification.
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and the interminable conferences subjected to signature and rati­
fication and even possibly to reservations in the making of a mul­
tilateral treaty, the idea of resolutions of the General Assembly 
as being of the nature of 'instant' law is probably a pleasant one. 
For these, the resolution provides a rapid mode of keeping up 
with technological and scientific developments in a fast-moving 
world and is no more than the modern synonym for customary in­
ternational law as expressing the juridical conscience of peoples 
as are treaties themselves. However, the very system which hin­
ders the law-making process provides a 'safeguard' procedure 
before final adoption: something which the resolution is definitely 
lacking in. 
And there are resolutions and resolutions: one must immediately 
make a distinction between those resolutions made i n  virtue of 
Article 17 of the United Nations Charterl and those which ·are of a 
more general character, and between those resolutions which have 
been adopted in a unanimous as opposed to a majority form. 
It is true that at the San Francisco Conference, convened to set 
up the Organization, the Phillipine proposal to endow the General 
Assembly with the power to enact rules of i nternational law was 
met with much disapproval and that therefore if Charter intent is 
to be decisively and strictly constructed, it becomes impossible 
to attribute binding legal force to resolutions of the General As­
sembly or to consider that it is in any sense an active, potential, 
or partial legislative organ. 
In fact, although within the four corners of the Charter, General 
Assembly resolutions under Article 17 are necessarily of binding 
legal character on all member States for they refer to the approving 
of the United Nations budget and to the apportioning among the 
members of the payment of United Nations expenses, the extent to 
which General Assembly resolutions of a more general nature are 
legally binding on members is doubtful. 
As often is the case, the drive towards a legislative solution is
often blunted by a very broad and abstract resolution which is 
operationally i rrelevant. One such example can be found in the 
Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 
which embodies broad principles formulated in such a way as to 
2 Article 17(2) of the United Na tions Charter reads as follows:
'The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and 
budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 
57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized 
agencies with a view to making reco mmenda tions to the agencies con­
cerned.' 
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receive an affirmative vote from all States. No attempt is made to 
legislate a solution of a real dispute going on in an international 
society, presumably because a particular political stand on a de­
bated issue can never hope to be approved by the conflicting 
ideologies of prominent Powers. 
Another resolution, Resolution 1653(XVI) of November 28th, 
1961, lacks Great Power consensus. Although it is ineffective in
direct terms, it declares that the use of nuclear weapons would 
constitute 'a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations, 
is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of 
humani ty and that (a)ny state using nuclear and thermonuclear 
weapons is acting contrary to the laws of humanity and is com­
m1ttmg a crime against mankind and civilization'. The present 
value of such a resolution is limited to evidence of the legal 
basis of the rule that an obligation exists to use nuclear weapons 
only, if at all, in a reprisal against a State that uses them first. 
At least it shows an attempt to resolve the dispute of the legality 
or otherwise of nuclear weapons as instruments of warfare by ta­
king a definite stand on the controversial issue. 
A resolution of a more optimistic nature is Resolution 1884 
(XVIII), which calls upon all nations not to station in outer space 
'any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of wea­
pons of mass destruction'. It enjoys the backing of the Super 
Powers and is considered by Government officials as one of the 
major steps in the area of arms control. 
One must further distinguish between those resolutions which 
have been unanimously adopted and those which have only re­
ceived a majority acceptance of States. It is easier to argue in the 
first instance that resolutions are a source of international law, 
for here the resolution is declaratory of a common stand which 
States have taken on a fundamental issue. Can it be said, on the 
other hand, that a resolution of the General Assembly which has 
only been adopted by a majority of members creates law for the 
international community as a whole, or does it only regulate the 
actions of adopting States? If the former is the case, a powerful 
State in the minority could easily amend the law by the simple 
process of breaking it, while if the latter proposition is more fa­
vourable, it would only lead to two rather than one international 
commun ity with rules applying to adopting States and different 
rules applying to non-adopting States. If anything, it is those 
resolutions which are evidence of an international consensus 
which should be recognised as material sources of international 
law. Professor Friedmann holds that 'Without having the character 
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of a treaty, with all its constitutional implications, resolutions of 
chi s kind unquestionably are an important link in the continuing 
process of development and formulation of new principles in inter­
national law'. 3 
However, even here one runs into problems, for if one were to 
presume that the unanimous adoption of a. General Assembly 
resolution had the effect of changing the law on a certain subject, 
then the logical extension to this argument would be that such 
unanimity would also have to be expressed when such resolution 
had to be amended or revoked in view of changing conditions. Such 
reasonin g also bears the implication that every State, however 
politically insignificant, would legitimately exercise the veto at 
the expense of progress and even though the vesting of the 'veto' 
power in all would give true meaning to the sovereign equality of 
States as expressed in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter, 
this would hinder more than help the evolution of international 
law. 
One could rightly ask what the position in present�ay interna­
tional law is. Today it would seem as though there is a growing 
tendency to regard resolutions not so much as synonymous with 
formal treaties as an expression of agreement. Even if one is not 
prepared to recognise the resolution as a formal source of the law, 
one must admit that its material effect on the international com­
munity is such that even though it does not fulfil the role of le­
gislation as understood in the municipal sense, yet it forms the 
basis of an international mode of thinking aloud and is therefore, 
to say the least, a manifestation of an inter-State consensus. 
However, some writers are of the opinion that the very authors 
of a resolution may go one step further and create the law of the 
international community, thus inferring a transition from the dec­
laratory to the constitutive level. 
Rosal yn Higgins properly emphasises the extent to which an 
assessment of the legal status of General Assembly resolutions is 
associated with the over-all character of the law-creating process 
applicable to customary international law: 
'Resolutions of the Assembly are not "per se" binding, though 
those rules of general international law which they embody are 
binding on member States, with or without the help of the resolu­
tions. But, the body of resolutions as a whole taken as indicative 
of a general customary, law undoubtedly provide a rich source of 
3 Changing Structure of International Law. 
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evidence. '4 Higgins also shows that the drafters of a resolution
possess an inherent discretion in developing new rules of interna­
tional law in the guise of declaring old ones. Thus, we witness 
the blurring of the demarcation between the declaratory and the 
constitutive element and the subsequent transition from the former 
to the latter level. 
One thing is certain: Assembly resolutions play a crucial role 
independently of whether their status is to generate binding legal 
rules or to embody mere recommendations. The degree of authori­
tativeness that a particular resolution will acquire depends on its 
text, its intended and unintended objective and the distribution of 
power in an international society. On the other hand, the degree 
of authoritativeness which the general process of law-creating by 
the Assembly comes to enjoy depends on the extent to which 
those same particular resolutions influence action and gain no­
toriety in legal circles and also on the extent to which they be­
come absorbed into an evolving framework of international law. 
In the words of Friedmann: cln some cases they (unanimous 
resolutions) will be preparatory to formal international covenants; 
in other cases, they will serve as highly authoritative statements 
of international law in a certain field. The appreciation of this 
quality of all declaratory resolutions avoids the rather futile con­
troversy whether they are sources of law or not ••• International 
law is developing and being nourished· through a multitude of 
channels. While it would be absurd to equate them with formal 
treaties, it would be equally absurd to deny their importance in 
the continuing process of the articulation and evolution of inter­
national law' •5
In order to give a more complete picture of the changing struc­
ture of international law, it would be relevant to consider the 
work of the International Law Commission in the course of its
evolution and to examine how it fits in with the traditional no­
tions of the sources of international law, especially with refer­
ence to the whole procedure under Article 13(a) of the Charter.6 
4 Development of International Law through th,e Political Organs of the
United Nations. 
5 Changing Structure of Intemational Law.
6The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recom mendations
for the purpose of: 
( a) prom oting intemation al co-operation in the politic al fie ld and en­
couraging the progressive develop ment of international law and i ts codi­
fication. 
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Despite the original atmosphere of scept1c1sm into which the 
International Law Commission was born, its comparatively short 
life has witnessed a courageous attempt at international codifi­
cation. Its field of operation can be said to be divided into those 
areas wh ere the rules on the law at a given time are much in 
doubt and very controversial and those areas where agreed rules 
of law are already in existence. In the former case, codification 
usually takes the form of a compromise between the diverging 
opinions of States and therefore not altogether satisfactory a In the 
latter case, the Commission's role is more in the nature of eluci­
dation and elaboration of universally accepted principles. 
As recently as 1953, a former judge of the International Court 
of Justice7 committed himself to the opinion that attempts to codify 
international law within the larger community of the United Nations 
constitute a clear menace to the development of international law 
and that 'the prospects of codification of international law on a 
universal plane are nil'. 
Voices like these are thankfully in the minority; the codifica­
tion of international law is the only way in which controversial 
stands as to what the law is on a particular issue can be dimin­
ished if not obliterated. In the ultimate analysis, the codifying 
process is the only way in which we can safeguard the very es­
sence of international law. Professor Jennings' exhortation in 
1947 is no less urgent today: 
'It is surely evident that the implementing of Article 13 of the 
Charter is a task, the urgency and importance of which yield 
place to none of the other problems that face the international 
lawyer today'. 8 
During its relatively brief existence, the International Law 
Commission has been responsible for a Geneva Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, the 1961 Convention on Reduction of Stateless­
ness, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and 
the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, all of which 
are heavily based on drafts prepared by the International Law 
Commission and which provide very real evidence of the law at a 
particular moment in time. 
Some tentative conclusions may be drawn. In asking ourselves 
whether we are in fact moving towards newer sources in interna-
(b) Charles de Visscbee in Theories et R ealites en Droit International
Public 
7 Charles de Visscher in Theories et  Realites en Droit International 
8 
Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification. 
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tional law, we do not seem to have learnt our lesson. For, even 
though we have, through experience, learnt to deal warily with the 
municipal law analogy when discussing the very character of inter­
national law, it is not always realised how much the very sources 
of international law rest upon assumptions which emanate from 
municipal law practice. Thus we refer to law-making as opposed 
to contract treaties and to the persistent assumption that there is 
a great need in international law for some procedures for legisla­
tion. 
It is just possible that the search for what Jennings refers to as 
<the statute - substitute' has made us blind to the actual method 
of law-making which international practice has devised and which 
is taking place before our very eyes, if only we would recognise 
and accept it.
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